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1. Introduction 
An RFID system is a tracking and tracing system, and is useful for the management of 
various items and animals in a supply chain, animal husbandry and so on. According to a 
Japanese investigation firm, the number of RFID tags in Japan will increase rapidly from 51 
million in 2007 to 1.7 billion in 2012 (Yano Research Institute, 2008). 
In RFID systems, RFID tags, which have unique IDs, are attached to items, and RFID readers 
confirm whether something is there and identify what it is by obtaining its ID. It is, 
however, pointed out that exploiting RFID systems could lead to some privacy issues. One 
issue is that someone may know what you have by getting the IDs of your items. Another 
one is that someone may know when and where you were by recording the time and the 
place at which the IDs were obtained. Many kinds of countermeasures against these issues 
have been proposed. Some of them have been implemented in RFID products. 
This chapter explains the privacy issues concerning RFID systems, their countermeasures 
and finally compares them from the security point of view. 
2. An RFID system and its privacy issues 
2.1 A basic RFID system 
At first, we explain a basic RFID system in which an RFID tag, hereafter called a Tag, emits a 
plaintext of its ID to a Reader.  The RFID system consists of the Tags, the Reader and a Server.  
The Server assigns a unique ID to each Tag preliminarily (Fig. 1-1)). This task may be done 
by manufacturers when shipping. The Server records the IDs and their corresponding 
information to its database (Fig. 1-2)). In the phase of reading the ID of the Tag, the Reader 
sends an ID-query to a Tag (Fig. 1-3)) and receives the ID as a response from the Tag (Fig. 1-
4)). The Reader forwards the ID to the Server (Fig. 1-5)), and the Server looks up its 
corresponding information in the database (Fig. 1-6)). 
                                                 
1 Views expressed in this chapter are those of authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
official views of the Bank of Japan and National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science 
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1) A unique ID
2) Record the ID and its corresponding
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3) An ID-query
4) A response
( = The ID)
6) Look up the ID in the database
5) The ID
 
Fig. 1.  A basic RFID system 
2.2 Privacy issues on the RFID systems 
It is worried that usage of RFID systems could lead to privacy violations in the following 
two senses. One issue is that someone, hereafter called an Adversary, may know what you 
have by obtaining the IDs of your items if the Adversary knows the relationship between 
the IDs and their corresponding information. The IDs can be obtaining by eavesdropping on 
the communications between legitimate Readers and Tags or by the Adversary sending an 
ID-query to your Tags.  The Adversary may guess the corresponding information of a new 
ID from known IDs if the ID format is “an identifier of a company, an identifier of a product, 
an identifier of an individual product.” We call this issue belongings privacy in this chapter. 
Another issue is that the Adversary may know where you have been. Suppose you go 
around in a city with Tag-attached items. And the Adversary is supposed to locate many 
Readers in various places in the city, e.g. a hospital, a supermarket or an apartment, in order 
to collect IDs from people who pass near the Readers. For example, your ID, to be accurate, 
an ID of your item, is contained in two sets of IDs. The sets consist of IDs which were 
collected at the hospital and at your apartment, respectively. The Adversary may guess you 
are sick by confirming that your ID is contained in the two sets. That is, the Adversary 
knows where you have been by confirming the link of collected IDs, in other words, 
whether the IDs are emitted by the same Tag or not.  This issue is called location privacy. 
2.3 Approaches of countermeasures against privacy issues 
Countermeasures against belongings privacy are to prevent an Adversary from obtaining 
IDs themselves or the relationship between IDs and items. The countermeasures against 
obtaining IDs are 1) to conceal the existance of Tags by preventing Tags from emitting any 
IDs and signals, 2) to prevent the Adversary from obtaining IDs by generating jamming and 
3) to record not plaintexts of IDs but ciphertexts of the IDs in the Tags. The countermeasures 
against obtaining the relationships are 4) to make it difficult to guess the product of a new 
ID from the known relationship and 5) to employ strict access control on a database which 
records the relationship. 
Countermeasures against location privacy are countermeasures 1) and 2) above because 
they prevent the Adversary from obtaining IDs. Countermeasure 3) above is not effective 
against location privacy. The Adversary can confirm the link of ciphertexts emitted from 
Tags by regarding the ciphertexts as new identifiers of the Tags if the ciphertexts are static.  
Therefore, for solving the location privacy, we need to make it difficult for the Adversary 
not only to extract IDs from the ciphertexts but also to confirm the link of ciphertexts. We 
call this countermeasure 6). Of course the Server must resolve the IDs from the recieved 
ciphertexts. 
The countermeasures 4) and 5) above are not specific ones for RFID systems but can be used 
in general for information systems which use IDs and databases.  Therefore we may refer to 
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operational countermeasures for such kinds of systems. Countermeasures 1) and 2) are 
effective against both issues. In addition, countermeasure 6) is more sophisticated than 
countermeasure 3).  Consequently, we focus on countermeasures against location privacy, 
i.e. countermeasures 1), 2) and 6), hereafter.  Fig. 2 shows the relation between the three 
countermeasures. 
 
1) Countermeasures to conceal the existence of Tags (Sect. 4)
yes
no
2) Countermeasures to emit extra data or noise (Sect. 5)
yes
no
6) Countermeasures to convert the IDs of Tags (Sect. 6)
Concealment of the existence of Tags
Emission of extra data or noise
 
Fig. 2.  Approaches of the countermeasures against location privacy 
3. Assumptions of an adversary 
We assume the following conditions for an Adversary: 
- The Adversary cannot eavesdrop upon communications between a legitimate Server 
and legitimate Tags (Fig. 3-1)) because the ID assignment process is done in a secure 
area. 
- The Adversary cannot obtain IDs and the corresponding information from the Server’s 
database because the database is appropriately managed. 
- The Adversary can eavesdrop upon the communication between a legitimate Reader 
and legitimate Tags (Fig. 3-3), 4)) because they communicate through a public channel. 
- The Adversary can send ID-queries to the legitimate Tags (Fig. 3-3’), 4’)). 
- The Adversary cannot eavesdrop the communication between the legitimate Reader 
and the Server (Fig. 3-5)) because they communicate through a secure channel, e.g. 
Virtual Private Network. 
- The Adversary can extract secret information, e.g. an ID and a cryptographic key, from 
the Tag. 
 
Legitimate Tag
Item
Legitimate Reader
Server
Attribute informationID
1) Database
3)
4)
5)
Malicious Reader
3’)
4’)
A secure channel
A public channel
 
Fig. 3. The secure and public channels in the RFID system 
Fig. 3 shows the secure channels and public ones in the RFID system.  In order to make 
descriptions simple after section 4, we assume the Reader has the Server’s resources, i.e. the 
computation power, the memory and the database.  In other words, we describe the Server’s 
task as the Reader’s one. 
4. Countermeasures to conceal the existence of Tags 
This section introduces countermeasures which prevent Tags from emitting responses and 
signals against ID-queries. These countermeasures can conceal the existence of a Tag though 
we cannot receive the services of the RFID system. 
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4.1 Destroying / detaching Tag 
This countermeasure is to destroy or to detach a Tag from an item. After destroying or 
detaching, we cannot permanently use the Tag. The means of destruction are, for example, 
to cut the antenna of the Tag by scissors, to burn off the logical circuits in the Tag by a high 
voltage electrical current and so on. 
4.2 Faraday cage 
This countermeasure is to wrap a Tag with some material, e.g. foil, which intercepts 
electromagnetic waves, i.e. ID-queries, in order to prevent the Tag from emitting responses. 
It is, however, difficult to apply the countermeasure to some items, such as large things, pets 
and domestic animals. 
4.3 Kill command 
This countermeasure is to implement a specific command on a Tag, which prevents the Tag 
from emitting responses.  The Tag does not respond permanently after the Tag executes the 
command. Compared with the destroying/detaching of the Tag, this countermeasure 
disables the Tag only by executing the command. Therefore in order to protect against its 
misuse, we need to authenticate the Reader which directs the Tag to execute the command. 
The command is implemented as a Kill command in a Tag, conforming to EPCglobal 
specification. The Tag has an authentication mechanism in which the Tag verifies a 
password sent by a Reader.  The bit lengths of the password are 8 bits in EPCglobal Class 1 
in frequency range of 860 MHz – 930 MHz (Auto-ID Center, 2002), 24 bits in Class 0 in that 
of 900 MHz (Auto-ID Center, 2003a) and Class 1 in that of 13.56 MHz (Auto-ID Center, 
2003b), and 32 bits in Class 1 Generation 2 (ISO 18000-6 Type C, EPCglobal Inc., 2005), 
respectively. However, the number of the variation of the password is 256 at most in the 
case of an 8-bit password, it is not secure from the viewpoint of cryptography, that is, the 
Adversary may cause the Tag to execute the command.  
4.4 Access password schemes 
This countermeasure, hereafter called an access password scheme, is to respond an ID of a Tag 
when the Tag receives a correct password from a Reader. The countermeasure is relatively 
easy to implement and can conceal the existence of the Tag from an Adversary. However, 
the Adversary can obtain the password and the ID by eavesdropping upon the 
communication between the legitimate Reader and the Tag. The countermeasure is adopted 
in EPCglobal Class 1 Generation 2 (ISO 18000-6 Type C) and the bit length of password is 32 
(EPCglobal Inc., 2005). 
4.5 Hash Lock scheme 
This countermeasure, called Hash Lock scheme, involves a Tag authenticating a Reader before 
sending its ID as a response (Weis et al., 2003). This scheme is executed with the following 
procedures: 
1. A Reader generates a password for each Tag and calculates a hash value for each 
password. The Reader assigns a unique ID and the hash value to each Tag.  In addition, 
the Reader stores the IDs, the corresponding hash values and passwords in the 
database. 
2. Upon receiving an ID-query from the Reader, the Tag sends its hash value to the Reader. 
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3. The Reader looks up the corresponding password in the database and sends the 
password to the Tag. 
4. The Tag calculates the hash value of the password and compares it with the stored one.  
The Tag sends its ID if it matches. 
The advantage of Hash Lock scheme over the access password scheme is that a lot of time is 
required in order to guess the password from the secret information in the Tag. An 
Adversary must analyze the hash value in the Hash Lock scheme but need not analyze it in 
the access password scheme. The Adversary, however, can obtain the password against 
both schemes only by eavesdropping upon communications between a legitimate Reader 
and the Tags. The Adversary can confirm the links between the responses, i.e. the hash 
values, because the responses are static in Hash Lock scheme. 
4.6 Change of operation modes 
This countermeasure is to flexibly select whether to conceal the existence of the Tag or not by 
changing the operation modes of the Tag. Many schemes related to this countermeasure are 
proposed. We introduce two of these schemes in this section: EPCglobal Class 1 in frequency 
range of 860 MHz – 930 MHz (Auto-ID Center, 2002) and LKI scheme (Liu et al., 2004). 
In EPCglobal Class 1 at 860 MHz – 930 MHz, the operation mode in which the Tag sends its 
ID is called an Active mode and the operation mode in which the Tag dose not emit its ID and 
signal is called a Quiet mode. And two commands are also implemented. The command, 
called a Talk command, changes the Tag to Active mode. Another one, called a Quiet 
command, changes the Tag to the Quiet mode. This scheme should keep supplying electric 
power to the Tag in order to maintain the Tag in each mode. Therefore, an Adversary may 
notice the existence of the Tag by detecting the supply source. Moreover, it needs an 
authentication mechanism that prevents the Adversary from executing the commands. 
In LKI scheme, the operation mode in which the Tag does not emit its ID and signal is called 
a Silent mode. LKI scheme assumes that the Tag has a non-volatile memory to record the 
operation mode. Then the Tag maintains its operation mode without electric power. This 
scheme also needs the authentication mechanism. According to Liu et al., the password-
based authentication may be enough if the password is managed appropriately and 
legitimate Readers pay appropriate attention to eavesdropping upon communication of 
authentication (Liu et al., 2004). 
5. Countermeasures to emit extra data or noise 
This section introduces countermeasures using extra devices which emit extra data or noise. 
The countermeasures can prevent an Adversary from obtaining a Tag's ID even if the Tag 
emits its ID as it is. The countermeasures cannot conceal the existence of the Tag, or to be 
accurate the extra device, but require no changes or only small changes to the Tag. 
5.1 Jamming 
An extra device in this countermeasure emits jamming to prevent a Reader from obtaining a 
Tag’s ID. This countermeasure requires no changes in the Tag. Moreover, a legitimate 
Reader cannot obtain the ID if the device emits jamming.  Its disadvantages are follows: 
- Some countries restrict the emission of jamming. Moreover, the emission of 
electromagnetic waves is restricted in some areas, e.g. hospitals. This countermeasure 
cannot be employed in such situations. 
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- This countermeasure may prevent Readers in other RFID systems from communicating 
with Tags. 
- An Adversary may be able to trace the Tag by continuously observing the source of the 
jamming. 
5.2 Blocker Tag 
Readers use anti-collision protocols for obtaining multi Tags’ IDs sequentially in RFID 
systems. An extra device, called a Blocker Tag, emits many dummy IDs in order to obstruct 
the execution of a Binary Tree protocol which is one of the anti-collision protocols (Juels et al., 
2003).  We introduce a Blocker Tag. 
At first, we explain the mechanism of the Binary Tree protocol. Suppose each Tag has a 2-bit 
ID and there are two Tags, whose IDs are 00 and 10 respectively, in the range where a 
Reader can communicate with them. The Reader using the protocol obtains the IDs with the 
following procedures (Fig. 4): 
 
1) Query the 1st MSB of ID.
ID is 00
5) Query the next bit to 
Tags which 1st MSB is 1.
3) Query the next bit to 
Tags which 1st MSB is 0.
2) The response is 0. 2) The response is 1.
4) The response is 00. 5) The response is 10.
ID is 10ID is 01 ID is 11
 
Fig. 4. Binary Tree protocol 
1. The Reader asks Tags their most significant bits (MSBs) of their IDs.   
2. Each Tag sends 0 or 1, and the Reader detects MSBs of the Tags in the area where the 
Reader can communicate. 
3. The Reader asks the Tags for the next bit of the IDs whose MSBs are 0. 
4. The Tag sends 00 and the Reader detects the Tag with 00. 
5. The Reader asks the Tags for the next bit of the IDs whose MSBs are 1 in the same way.  
And it also detects the Tag with 10. 
A Blocker Tag behaves as if there were every ID in the range. That is, the Blocker Tag emits 
“00 and 01” and “10 and 11” in the 4th and 5th steps of the above, respectively. Therefore, 
the Reader obtains all of the IDs, i.e. 00, 01, 10 and 11. The bit length is only 2 bits in the 
above case, but the length is longer, e.g. 128 bits, in practical systems. Then the Reader fails 
to obtain the all of the IDs. 
This scheme needs no change to the Tag. Moreover, the Blocker Tag is not more sever than 
jamming from the viewpoint of the restriction of the emission of electromagnetic waves 
because the Blocker Tag reacts only when receiving queries2. The disadvantages of the 
Blocker Tag are a) a user must carry it, b) it may obstruct Readers communicating with Tags 
in other RFID systems, c) an Adversary with a smart Reader, which can accurately identify 
the location of a Tag sending its ID, may obtain the ID. 
                                                 
2 The restriction of the emission is not completely solved because the Blocker Tag reacts 
when receiving the queries. 
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A more sophisticated Blocker Tag, called a Selective/Partial Blocker Tag, is proposed (Juels et 
al., 2003). A Selective/Partial Blocker Tag obstructs the read of only pre-defined IDs, e.g. the 
MSB of the IDs is 1, though the original Blocker Tag obstructs the read of every ID. 
6. Countermeasures to convert the IDs of Tags 
This section introduces countermeasures which make it difficult for an Adversary to 
confirm the link of responses sent by Tags. Of course legitimate Readers can identify their 
IDs from the responses. Receiving ID-queries, the Tags always send the response. Therefore 
the countermeasures cannot conceal the existence of the Tags. 
6.1 Randomized Hash Lock scheme 
Randomized Hash Lock scheme assumes Tags are implemented with a pseudo-random 
generator and a one-way hash function H()3 (Weis et al., 2003). The Tags emit the hash value 
of their IDs and random numbers. The security of this scheme is based on the difficulty of 
inversion of the one-way hash function. A concrete procedure is as follows: 
1. Upon receiving an ID-query, a Tag generates random number r and calculates hash 
value h of its ID and r, i.e. h = H(ID||r), where ID|| r denotes concatenation between 
ID and r.  And the Tag sends h and r as its response to the Reader. 
2. Upon receiving h and r, the Reader calculates the hash value H(x||r), where x denotes 
each ID of the Tags managed by the Reader. And the Reader exhaustively searches for x 
such that H(x||r) matches h. The Reader regards the corresponding x as the Tag's ID if 
it matches. 
It is difficult for an Adversary to identify the Tag's ID by comparing the responses mutually 
because the responses sent by the Tag change at each ID-query. However, this scheme may 
have two problems: a) the Adversary may be able to identify the ID from the response by 
exhaustively searching, like the Reader, if the number of candidate IDs is small, b) the 
computational complexity for the Reader identifying the ID is proportional to the product of 
the following two factors: the number of the Tags that the Reader manages and the number 
of the Tags in the area where the Reader can communicate. 
6.2 Symmetric Key Cryptography based schemes 
It is possible to solve problems a) and b) of Randomized Hash Lock scheme if Tags are 
implemented with a pseudo-random generator, a symmetric key encryption function and a 
non-volatile memory. The scheme with the symmetric key cryptography, hereafter called an 
SKC-based scheme, is as follows: 
1. A Reader preliminarily records symmetric key k, which is common to the RFID system, 
to each Tag. 
2. Upon receiving an ID-query, the Tag generates random number r and encrypts r and its 
ID with k and SE(), where SE() denotes a symmetric key encryption function. And it 
sends ciphertext c = SE(k, r||ID) as its response to the Reader. 
3. Upon receiving c, the Reader obtains r||ID by decrypting c with k and extracts the ID. 
                                                 
3 A one-way function transforms an arbitrary length bit string into a fixed-length one. It is 
easy to calculate its output from the bit string and is difficult to calculate the string from the 
output. 
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The responses sent by the same Tag are different because the Tag generates random 
numbers at each ID query. Moreover, an Adversary needs to break the symmetric key 
cryptography for extracting IDs from the responses. Therefore, it is difficult for the 
Adversary to guess the IDs and to confirm the links between the responses if the symmetric 
key cryptography adopted is secure. 
6.3 Hash Chain scheme 
An Adversary may record ID-queries, the corresponding responses and dates/places when 
recording, and store them for a long time. The Adversary will have the opportunity to 
confirm the link of the responses if the secret information, e.g. a secret key, is leaked in the 
future.  Therefore, a new security feature, called forward security, is proposed.  In this feature, 
it is difficult for the Adversary who obtains the leaked secret information to confirm the link 
of the responses.  We introduce Hash Chain scheme which is a typical scheme to fulfill the role 
of this feature (Ohkubo et al., 2003). This scheme assumes that Tags are implemented with 
two one-way functions H() and G(). Its procedure is as follows: 
1. A Reader preliminarily assigns a different key to each Tag and stores each ID and the 
corresponding key in the Reader’s database. We describe the initial key of Tag-i as ki, 0 (1 
≤ i ≤ n), where n is the number of Tags managed by the Reader. 
2. Upon receiving an ID-query, Tag-i calculates hash value hi, 0 = H(ki, 0) and sends hi, 0 as 
its response to the Reader. And Tag-i updates ki, 0 with G() and replaces ki, 0 by ki, 1 = G(ki, 
0).  The key of Tag-i is updated when receiving the queries. 
3. Upon receiving the response h, the Reader calculates hi, t + j = H(Gj(ki, t)) and searches for 
i and j such that h = hi, t + j, where Gj() = G(Gj - 1()), 0 ≤ j ≤ s.  s denotes a range where the 
Reader searches for the hash value. And ki, t denotes the Tag-i's key recorded in the 
database at that time. 
4. The Reader considers the sender of the response as Tag-i if matching. The key of Tag-i is 
ki, t + j at this time.  The Reader replace ki, t + j in the database by ki, t + j + 1 = G(ki, t + j). 
The security of this scheme is based on the difficulty of inversion of the hash functions.  It is 
difficult for the Adversary to guess the former keys from the key obtained by the Adversary 
at a certain time because the keys are updated with G(). Then the scheme satisfies forward 
security if G() is sufficiently secure. Moreover, it is also difficult for the Adversary to 
confirm the link of the responses because the responses are generated by calculating the 
hash value of the keys with H(). However, the computational complexity for the Reader 
identifying the ID is proportional to the product of the following three factors: the number 
of the Tags managed by the Reader, the number of the Tags in the area where the Reader 
can communicate, and the number of the key updates which are not comprehended by the 
Reader. Moreover, the Tag updates its key even if a malicious Reader sends an ID-query to 
the Tag. The Tag’s key goes out of the range in which the Reader searches if the malicious 
Reader sends ID-queries s times. That is, the legitimate Reader cannot identify the ID in this 
case. 
6.4 Public Key Cryptography based schemes 
We can construct a scheme which contains the following two features if Tags are 
implemented with a pseudo-random generator and a public key encrypting function: a) the 
scheme satisfies forward security, b) the Reader need not search for IDs exhaustively. The 
procedure of the scheme, hereafter called a PKC-based scheme, is as follows: 
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1. The Reader preliminarily writes its public key and a Tag’s ID into the Tag. 
2. Upon receiving an ID-query, the Tag generates a random number and encrypts the 
number and its ID with the public key. And the Tag sends the ciphertext as its response 
to the Reader. 
3. Upon receiving the ciphertext, the Reader decrypts it with the Reader’s secret key and 
extracts the ID. 
An Adversary needs a Tag’s ID, the Reader’s public key, the responses and the random 
numbers used for generating the responses in order to confirm the link between the 
responses. The Adversary can obtain the ID and the public key by analysing the Tag, and 
can obtain the responses by eavesdropping upon the communication between the Reader 
and the Tag. The Adversary, however, cannot obtain the random numbers because the 
numbers are deleted when the responses are generated. Therefore, this scheme satisfies 
forward security if the pseudo-random generator adopted is secure.  Moreover, the Reader 
need not search for IDs exhaustively because the Reader can obtain the IDs only by 
decrypting the responses. However, general public key cryptosystems (PKCs), e.g. RSA and 
elliptic curve cryptography, are not suitable for low performance RFID tags because of the 
computational complexities of such cryptosystems.  Then, Suzuki et al. focus on Niederreiter 
PKC which is a lightweight PKC and is suitable for Tags because its encryption can be 
performed only with exclusive-OR in the parallel processing (Niederreiter, 1986). In 
addition, Suzuki et al. propose a new scheme in which the PKC is optimised suitably for the 
Tag (Suzuki et al., 2006).  
6.5 Re-encryption schemes 
Some PKCs in a specific class can update ciphertexts only with their public keys, the 
ciphertexts and random numbers. Of course the plaintexts of the updated ciphertexts are the 
same as the plaintexts of the original ciphertexts. ElGamal PKC is known as one of such 
PKCs (ElGamal, 1985). 
A scheme, called a Re-encryption scheme, using such a PKC has been proposed (Juels & 
Pappu, 2003). This scheme assumes a Tag is implemented with a pseudo-random generator 
and the PKC. A Reader preliminarily writes a ciphertext of a Tag’s ID and the public key of 
the Reader into the Tag. Upon receiving an ID-query, the Tag sends its ciphertext as its 
response and updates the ciphertext. The Reader can identify the ID in the same way as a 
Reader in a PKC-based scheme does. 
The advantage of the Re-encryption scheme over the PKC-based scheme is that it does not 
store the plaintext of the ID in the Tag. On the other hand, the Tag cannot flexibly execute the 
reactions which correspond with its ID because the Tag does not know its ID. Moreover, the 
computational complexity of the updating is not low because the complexity is equal to that of 
encryption with ElGamal PKC. As a result, Juels and Pappu proposed a scheme in which the 
Reader updates the Tag’s ciphertext and writes the ciphertext in the Tag in order to reduce the 
computational complexity of the Tag (Juels & Pappu, 2003). However, the Tag in the scheme 
needs to authenticate the Reader in order to prevent a malicious Reader from forging it. 
7. Comparisons 
This section compares the above schemes from the viewpoints of four security features: 1) 
concealment existence of Tags from an Adversary, 2) secrecy of IDs, which is the feature that 
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the Adversary cannot identify the IDs, 3) unlinkability, which is the feature that the 
Adversary cannot confirm the link between responses, 4) foward security.  Table 1 shows 
the results of the comparisons. 
“o” and “x” in Table 1 denote that the countermeasure satisfies the corresponding feature 
and that the countermeasure does not, respectively. The schemes with “o” concering feature 
1) are some of the schemes based on the approach of not emitting the ID and signals. The 
majority of schemes introduced in this chapter can be represented as the mark of “o” 
concering features 2) and 3). The schemes with “o” concering feature 4) are a part of the 
schemes based on the approach of converting the Tag’s ID. 
The Adversary may confirm the link by sending ID-queries frequently and by tracing the 
source of the responses continuously if the schemes cannot conceal the existence of the Tag.  
It is preferable to adopt the schemes with “o” concering feature 1) for protecting against this 
attack. On the other hand, it may be preferable to adopt the schemes with “o” concerning 
feature 4) if the attack is not assumed. For example, Hash Chain scheme, PKC-based 
schemes and Re-encryption schemes correspond to such schemes. However, these schemes 
assume a Tag whose performance is middle or more. 
 
                                                   Security features 
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No countermeasures x x x x 
Destroying/detaching Tags (Sect. 4.1) o o o x 
Faraday cage (Sect. 4.2) o o o x 
Kill command (Sect. 4.3) o o o x 
Access password schemes (Sect. 4.4) x *a x *a x *a x 
Hash Lock scheme (Sect. 4.5) x *a x *a x *a x 
EPCglobal Class 1 (Quiet mode) (Sect. 4.6) x *b o o x 
LKI scheme (Silent mode) (Sect. 4.6) o o o x 
Jamming (Sect. 5.1) x o o x 
Blocker Tag (Sect. 5.2) x o o x 
Randomized Hash Lock scheme (Sect. 6.1) x o o x 
SKC-based schemes (Sect. 6.2) x o o x 
Hash Chain scheme (Sect. 6.3) x o o o 
PKC-based schemes (Sect. 6.4) x o o o 
Re-encryption schemes (Sect. 6.5) x o o o 
Table 1.  Security features of each countermeasure.  Grey cells show the negative features.  
“*a” denotes the fact that the Adversary can obtain IDs and passwords, if the Adversary 
eavesdrops upon communications between a legitimate Reader and the Tags. After 
obtaining them, the Adversary can detect the Tags, can identify the IDs and can confirm the 
link. “*b” denotes the fact that the Adversary may notice the existence of the Tags due to 
detecting the power sources. 
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8. Conclusions 
We explained two privacy issues on RFID systems in this chapter. One is an adversary 
may know the items you have and the other is your locations might be traced by linking 
RFID responses. In addition, we explained known approaches against these issues with 
concrete schemes. Finally, we compared them from the viewpoint of the four security 
features. Some of the schemes, which do not require heavy burden on tags, have already 
been implemented in some current RFID products. The other schemes, however, require 
certain technical break through to reduce the cost for implementing them and leave 
themes to study. 
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